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Abstract
Title of Dissertation:
Analysis on collision accidents and maritime
autonomous surface ships
Degree:

Master of Science

Human factors contribute to the occurrence of maritime accidents to the large extent.
Therefore, the importance of human factors has been addressed in the area of accident
investigation. On the other hand, recently, maritime autonomous surface ships
(MASS) have been developed due to the rapid growth of relevant technologies. One
of the expectations of MASS is to improve the safety of shipping by reducing human
errors. In this context, this dissertation analysed human factors in collision accidents
and assessed the effects of the introduction of MASS to collision accidents. Firstly, 98
collision accident reports from Japan and other countries were analysed utilising
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) and SHEL (Software,
Hardware, Environment, and Liveware) model. HFACS results showed a large
number of observations on unsafe acts which directly lead to the accident and its
preconditions. In addition, SHEL results showed a large number of human factors
which is the seafarer itself and related to the environment and other humans. Secondly,
a literature review on collision avoidance issues on MASS was conducted and several
challenges in terms of hardware, software and human factors were found. Finally, the
effects of different degrees of autonomy of MASS on human factors identified through
the analysis on collision accidents were assessed utilising a Likert scale likelihood
taking into account the findings from a literature review. The result showed the
likelihood of each human factor generally decreased with the increased degree of
autonomy of MASS.
KEYWORDS: Human factor, HFACS, SHEL model, Maritime Autonomous
Surface ships
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Traditionally, maritime safety has been improved by lessons learned from maritime
accidents, such as the accident of the Titanic in 1912, which led to the development of
the first version of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
in 1914. In addition, the traditional approach adopted technical countermeasures to
address identified safety issues. However, the accident of the Herald of Free
Enterprise in 1987 revealed the limitation of the technical approach and the necessity
of considering human and organizational factors (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2013).
Currently, it is well known that human factors play an important role in maritime
accidents. Although the original justification has been unclear, it has been widely
believed that about 80% of maritime accidents were contributed by human factors
(Wróbel, 2021).

The importance of human factors is acknowledged in a wide range of industries, and
several studies have been conducted. Firstly, studies addressed individual failures,
such as Rasmussen’s Skill-Rule-Knowledge classification and Reason’s Generic Error
Modeling System (GEMS), then linkage of individual, systematic and organizational
failures was focused on, such as Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model and Howkin’s SHEL
(Software, Hardware, Environment, and Liveware) model (Chen et al., 2013a). In the
fields of research on maritime accidents, the focus was shifted from naval architecture
to human factors from the 1960s to the 2010s and may continue to be socio-economic
matters (Luo & Shin, 2019).

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) started to address human and
organizational factors in maritime safety in a detailed and holistic way after the
accident of the Herald of Free Enterprise (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2013). In 1993,
the IMO adopted the International Safety Management Code (ISM Code), which
became mandatory in 1998 (IMO, 1993). In brief, the ISM Code was developed to
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deal with human errors and related maritime accidents and introduced a self-regulation
approach in the shipping industry that changed from previous command-and-control
practices (Dalaklis, 2017). The ISM Code requires companies to develop an integrated
Safety Management System (SMS), and the Code consists of several sections dealing
with different aspects (Batalden & Sydnes, 2014). In addition, other publications of
IMO work related to human factors can be found in the guidelines for the previous
casualty investigation code (Resolution A.849(20)) that was adopted in resolution
A.884(21) in 1999. To assist effective analysis and identification of preventive action
by providing practical advice for the systematic investigation of human factors in a
maritime accident, the guidelines included a detailed investigation process for human
factors by the approach of integration and adoption of several frameworks, namely
Hawkins’s SHEL and Reason’s GEMS as well as Rasmussen's Taxonomy of Error
(IMO, 1999). However, resolution A.849 (20) was revoked by the new resolution
A.1075 (28), and there is no specific mention of a particular method in the current
guidelines.

On the other hand, the recent rapid growth of technological developments has led to
the development of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS), and various pieces
of work from various aspects, such as industrial, scientific, and regulatory projects
have been conducted. For example, on the industrial side, it was reported that the
world's first electronic autonomous container ship would start commercial operation
in 2022 (Yara International, 2021). Furthermore, it was reported that the world's first
ocean passage of LNG carriers with autonomous navigation was initiated in 2022
(Hyundai Heavy Industries Group, 2022). Furthermore, at a national level, Japan
developed a roadmap that includes the practical realization of Phase II MASS, which
partly supports the seafarer who is the final decision maker through shoreside control
and action recommendation by Artificial Intelligence, by 2025 in its one of maritime
policies in 2018 ( Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism [MLIT],
2018). From this, several demonstration projects have been conducted for the early
demonstration of three core technologies, namely automated manoeuvring, distanced
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manoeuvring, and automated berthing/un-berthing (MLIT, n.d.). In addition, the
Safety Guidelines for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships were developed in 2022,
which include matters taken into account in terms of design, installation, and operation
to ensure the safety of Phase II MASS (MLIT, 2022).

At the international level, at the IMO, based on the view of a lack of clarity about the
application of existing IMO instruments to MASS, the work program of the regulatory
scoping exercise (RSE) on MASS was proposed to the Maritime Safety Committee
(MSC) on its 98th session (IMO, 2017a) and it was agreed to include to the agenda of
the MSC to RSE on MASS (IMO, 2017c). After discussions at several sessions of the
MSC, the outcome of the RSE was approved at MSC 103, which includes key issues
such as the development and clarification of terminologies and addressing the
functional and operational requirements for remote-control stations/centres (IMO,
2021). In addition to the work for the RSE, to ensure the safety, security, and
environmental protection regarding the trial of MASS, the Interim Guidelines for
MASS Trials were adopted at MSC 101, and the guidelines include the basic principle
that the trial should ensure at least the same degree of safety, security and
environmental protection provided by existing instruments (IMO, 2019). Currently,
the development of a non-mandatory code that regulates the operation of MASS in a
goal-based way with a view to adoption in 2024 has been conducted (IMO, 2022).

It is said that one of the advantages of MASS is the reduction of human errors. In
Japanese policy, one of the objectives of introducing MASS is to improve maritime
safety to reduce human errors, along with other objectives such as ensuring the
competitiveness of the maritime industry. However, it is expected that the degree of
involvement of human factors depends on the type of accidents, for example, fire and
collision. Furthermore, at the time this study was conducted, there was no specific
estimation of how the introduction of MASS will affect maritime accidents in Japan.
However, according to Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) (2022), 736 maritime
accidents were newly subjected to investigation by JTSB, and collisions occupied 192
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cases, followed by 165 cases of grounding in 2021. Furthermore, although there are
some exceptions, collisions have been the most frequent accident type in Japan in
recent years. Therefore, to estimate the effects of the introduction of MASS on
maritime accidents, this study addresses collision as an example of a frequently
observed accident type.

1.2. Aim and objectives
The aim of this dissertation is to evaluate the effectiveness of introducing MASS in
the context of collision accidents. Generally, human factors in maritime accidents are
a complex issue, and it is useful to analyse accident investigation reports since these
reports are made by experts. This study mainly relies on the reports from Japan, but
several reports from other countries are also analysed. In addition, taking into
consideration the time constraint, addressing collision accidents is limited to involving
container ships since it is expected that MASS will be actively introduced to container
ships as an example of the Yara. In fact, automated container handling is already
realized in some terminals due to two main reasons. Firstly, tasks are repetitive,
routine, and rule-based, and secondly, the predictable environment of operation (Ma,
2021). Therefore, together with the characteristics of liner shipping such as high
demands for on-time performance, it is expected that autonomous container ships will
be introduced to shipping industries.

1.3. Research questions
To achieve the objectives stated in section 1.2, the following research questions are
set:
I.
II.
III.

What are the characteristics of human factors in collision accidents?
What are the characteristics of MASS in collision accidents?
How does the introduction of MASS affect collision accidents?
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1.4. Research methodology
To answer the research questions presented in section 1.3, qualitative and quantitative
methods are adopted. For research question I, Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (HFACS) are utilized to analyse human factors in accident
investigation reports. Then, the SHEL model is utilized to analyse identified human
factors quantitively, especially extracting the interactive relationship between
identified factors. For research question II, literature review is adopted to analyse the
expected characteristics of MASS in collision accidents. Finally, for research question
III, a Likert scale likelihood scale of 5 has been adopted to assess the effects of
different degrees of autonomy of MASS on identified human factors for research
question I, taking into account the result of research questions II with the validation
by the experts within WMU.

1.5. Expected result
This study assumes the following information as a result:


Major human factors contribute to the occasion of collision accidents and their
relationship



Advantages and disadvantages of MASS in terms of collision-related issues



Effect of introduction of MASS in terms of human factors identified by
analysis of accident investigation reports
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2. Analysis of collision accidents
2.1. Human Factor analysis methods
2.1.1. SHEL and HFACS
There is a number of human factor-related theories utilised in various area. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, some methods were adopted in the former IMO
guidelines for the casualty investigation code. The first method is the SHEL model,
which addresses human factors from a system perspective. The SHEL model was
originally developed by Edgar (1972, as cited in Hawkins, 2017) and lately modified
by Hawkins (1984, as cited in Hawkins, 2017) based on the building block model. As
indicated in its name, the model has four components, namely, Software (S), Hardware
(H), Environment (E), and Liveware (L, Human), and represents interactions of them,
as shown in Figure 2-1.
Figure 2-1.
SHEL model

Note. Adopted from “Human Factors in Flight”, by F. H., Hawkins, 2017, p.25.
Copyright 1987 by F. H., Hawkins

Liveware is located in the hub of the model and has various characteristics and aspects,
such as physical characteristics, information processing, environmental tolerances,
and other components connected to Liveware (Hawkins, 2017). Focus on interfaces,
L-H interface is one of the most common sources of the error in man-machine systems,
such as an inappropriate seat and pilot/passenger. The L-S interface includes non-
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physical items of the systems such as procedures, manuals, and computer programs.
This interface is generally less definite but more difficult to solve compared to L-H
interface. The L-E interface includes noise, heat, and violation that increase errors or
reduce performances, which leads to the occurrence of errors. The L-L interface is
addressing factors between people such as teamwork and leadership (Hawkins, 2017).
Therefore, some modification to the SHEL model has been proposed. For example,
the m-SHEL model introduced management factors based on human factor activities
at a nuclear power plant in Japan (Kawano, 1997), and the SHELLO model was
developed to better categorise organisational factors for human factor evaluation of
aircraft maintenance technicians (Chang & Wang, 2010). The SHEL model has
advantages in its simpleness, understandability, and usefulness for reducing errors and
preventing accidents in the systems; however, the model has a limitation in that it does
not have interfaces outside human factors such as hardware-environment and
hardware-software (Kaptan et al., 2021).

Another method is the GEMS, which is an error classification system focused on
cognitive factors proposed by Reason (1990). The GEMS is mainly based on
Rasmussen's skill-rule-knowledge classification of human performance and consists
of three basic error types, ie skill-based slips and lapses, rule-based, and knowledgebased errors. These can be divided into two operational areas. Skill-based mistakes
and lapses are seen mainly associated with monitoring failures, while rule-based and
knowledge-based errors appear in problem-solving failures. Skill-based slips and
lapses usually involve inattention, such as omitting checks, and over-attention, such as
checking at an inappropriate time. Rule-based errors consist of misapplication of good
rules, such as inappropriate application of the proven utility of rules in a certain
condition, and application of bad rules, such as deficiencies from active components.
Knowledge-based errors are due to human cognition, such as inaccurate understanding
of systems, confirmation bias, and overconfidence. The GEMS is a useful taxonomy
technique for cognitive errors; however, the guidance for how to apply these errors is
limited, and it highly relies on the assessor's own judgments (Kirwan, 2017).
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In addition to the GEMS, Reason (1990) also developed the model of accident process
that is well known as the "Swiss cheese model". In the Swiss cheese model, there are
two categories of errors: active failures (unsafe acts) that affect the system
immediately and exist in front-line workers, and latent failures that exist in long time
systems and are only evident when combined with other factors and these exist at a
high level such as designer and decision maker in the systems. Latent failures consist
of three layers: 1) preconditions for unsafe acts, 2) unsafe supervision, and 3)
organisational influences. Each layer has small holes that mean deficiencies at each
level of the system, and an accident happens when the trajectory exists that penetrates
layers as a result of complex interactions of latent failures and local triggering events.
According to the model, for the purpose of fully understanding the accident, the
accident investigator needs to investigate all levels of the system. One of the
advantages of the Swiss cheese model for use in accident investigations is that it forces
the investigator to address latent failures within the accident causation process
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2017). Although the Swiss cheese model provides an
explanation of accident occurrence with a simple diagram and general framework that
helps data collection (Kaptan et al., 2021), the model does not define details about
holes in each layer; therefore, it is difficult to apply the model to real-world cases
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000).

Based on the Swiss cheese model, Shappell and Wiegmann developed the HFACS,
specifically for defining the active and latent failures of the Swiss cheese model
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2017). The HFACS was originally developed for the purpose
of systematically analysing human factors and improving accident investigation in the
area of aviation based on accident data in the military, commercial, and general
aviation sectors (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). The overview of the HFACS is shown
in Figure 2-2.
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Figure 2-2.
HFACS

Note. Adopted from “A Human Error Approach to Aviation Accident Analysis: The
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System” by D. A., Wiegmann, and S. A.,
Shappell, 2017, p.71. Copyright 2003 by D. A., Wiegmann, and S. A., Shappell

The HFACS consists of four layers; 1) Organisational influences, 2) Unsafe
supervision, 3) Preconditions for unsafe acts, and 4) Unsafe acts, with a total of 19
sub-categories that are categorised in the above four layers. Although the HFACS was
originally applied to the aviation sector, it has been widely applied in various areas
such as rail transport (Baysari et al., 2008; Madigan et al., 2016), mining (Patterson &
Shappell, 2010; Lenné et al., 2012), and nuclear (Kim et al., 2014), and the HAFCS is
considered as one of the most commonly used accident analysis methods in terms of
human factors (Hulme et al., 2019). The application of the HFACS to maritime
accidents will be addressed in the next section.
2.1.2. Previous studies on the analysis of maritime accidents utilised HFACS
According to Kaptan et al. (2021), HFACS was first used in the maritime sector by
Rothblum et al. (2002). They proposed to use HFACS as a tool for the incident
investigation program for addressing human errors in the offshore and maritime
industries as HFACS is relatively simple to use and learn and has achievements of
effective safety programs in the aviation sector. Several studies on maritime accident
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analysis utilised HFACS were conducted with some modifications from the original
HFACS that was developed by Shappell and Wiegmann for the purpose of improving
the applicability of their specific area (Kaptan et al., 2021).

Schröder-Hinrichs et al. (2011) developed HFACS-MSS for the purpose of reviewing
accidents related to machinery space fires and explosions. The most significant
modification from the original HFACS is the adoption of the fifth level, namely the
outside factors, which is above the fourth level, organisational influences, for the
purpose of capturing the effects of safety regulations on shipping and their
enforcement. The results of reviewing 41 accident investigation reports developed by
several countries between 1990 and 2006 showed that few organisational factors were
identified from the reports although organisational factors have been considered as
major safety factors by the IMO, while the investigation reports mainly focused on
technical components of the socio-technical system.

Chen et al. (2013b) proposed the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
for Maritime Accidents (HFACS-MA) for the purpose of analysing maritime accidents
in accordance with the (previous) IMO guidelines for a casualty investigation code.
Three major modifications were adopted to HFACS-MA from the original HFACS.
Firstly, the first level, unsafe acts, was modified to adopt the Generic Error Modelling
System (GEMS) with three sub-categories of errors, ie Skill-based errors, Rule-based
errors, and Knowledge-based errors. Secondly, the second level, originally named
preconditions for unsafe acts, was modified to adopt the SHEL model and named as
Preconditions (SHEL). These modifications were to comply with the IMO guidelines.
Thirdly, the fifth level, namely external factors, which consist of three sub-categories:
legislation gaps, administration oversights, and design flaws, was added above the
level of organisational influences for the purpose of capturing safety deficiencies
beyond the scope of organisations. Chen et al. (2013b) presented a method that
integrated HFACS-MA and Why-Because Graph and showed an advantage in gaining
insight into an accident through a case study of the Herald of Free Enterprise accident.
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Focusing on the HFACS applications to collision accidents, Chauvin et al. (2013)
developed HFACS-Coll based on 27 collision accidents between 1998 and 2012
investigated by the Transport Safety Board of Canada and the Marine Accident
Investigation Branch of the United Kingdom. The additional level, namely Outside,
consists of regulatory factors and others added above the level of organisational
influences for the purpose of capturing factors such as the regulatory, economic,
political, and social environment that have become a constraint for other levels, for
example, international regulations and the Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) related
matters. In addition, the level of precondition for unsafe acts was modified from the
original HFACS, in which the sub-category of crew resource management in the
personnel factors was updated to the ship resource management containing inter-ship
communications and bridge resource management (BRM). This was done for the
purpose of adopting HFACS to the collision avoidance activity and bridge space.
Chauvin et al. (2013) combined HFACS-Coll and Multiple Correspondence Analysis,
and the results showed three typical patterns of collision occasion; 1) restricted waters
with the pilot and problems on personnel factors (inter-ship communication and
BRM); 2) combinations of factors in different levels, visibility and inappropriate
instruments (precondition level), deficiency of attention (conditions of operators),
inappropriate operations (leadership level), and insufficient SMS (organisational
level); and 3) non-compliance with SMS.

For the purpose of analysing passenger ship accidents, HFACS-PV was developed by
Uğurlu et al. (2018) based on 70 collision and contact accidents involving passenger
ships between 1991 and 2015 investigated by 22 different organisations. The most
significant modification of HFACS-PV from the original HFACS was the adoption of
the additional level, namely operational conditions, below the level of unsafe acts for
the purpose of catching the situation that even if all necessary factors existed, the
accident would not happen without a presence of the key operational condition. Other
modifications were adopted to the level of preconditions for unsafe acts and consisted
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of sub standard team members and technology and interface malfunctions. The former
is based on the concept that the accident analysis should focus on all bridge members,
not only the master. The level of unsafe acts was also modified in the sub-categories
of violations. The results showed that operational conditions, unsafe acts, and
preconditions for unsafe acts occupied 19.92%, 35.01%, and 30.37% of all identified
factors, respectively. The significant factors within the unsafe acts were violations of
the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
(COLREG) rules 5 (lookout) and 6 (speed), and the importance of preventing
preconditions for unsafe acts was also highlighted.

2.2. Results
2.2.1. Methodology
Taking into account the scope and the purpose of this study, specifically, analysing
human factors in collision accidents involving container ships, the HFACS-Coll (see
Figure 2-3) was adopted as a human factor analysis method.
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Figure 2-3.
HFACS Coll.

Note. Adopted from “Human and organisational factors in maritime accidents:
Analysis of collisions at sea using the HFACS” by C., Chauvin, S., Lardjane, G., Morel,
J.-P., Clostermann, and B. Langard, 2013, Accident Analysis and Prevention, 59, p.29.
Copyright 2013 by Elsevier Ltd.
A total of 98 collision accidents involving at least one container ship occurring
between 2011 to 2020, investigated by JTSB and other organisations, and opened to
the public on their web pages, were analysed. The whole list of analysed reports is
shown in Appendix 1. The breakdown of organisations and the number of analysed
reports are as follows: Australian Transport Safety Bureau (1), Danish Maritime
Accident Investigation Board (1), Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
(8), Marine Accident Investigation Branch (7), National Transportation Safety Board
(4) and JTSB (77). Thirty-one reports including 10 reports from JTSB were written in
English and the rest of the 67 reports from JTSB were in Japanese; therefore, the
HFACS coding process was mainly conducted by the author with the review by experts
on the HFACS analysis at WMU. For the purpose of reducing the subjectivity of the
author, the coding was conducted with attention to avoiding re-investigation of each
accident in the way referring to the method that was adopted by Schröder-Hinrichs et
al. (2011) Specifically, the analysis part of the report was utilised for the coding
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process, while the conclusions or the equivalent part of the report was utilised for
confirmation purposes.

After identification and classification of the human factors utilised by HFACS Coll,
the SHEL model was utilised for further classification of human factors focusing on
interaction. Since categorisation for organisational and management factors has been
completed by HFACS Coll, and for the purpose of simplification, the original SHEL
model was adopted instead of the modified SHEL model, such as m-SHEL and
SHELLO.
2.2.2. HFACS results
A total of 532 (human) factors were identified through reviewing 98 accidents utilising
the HFACS Coll, and the overview of the results that include the 3rd Tier of the HFACS
Coll is shown in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1.
Overview of the HFACS result
1st Tier
2nd Tier
3rd Tier
Outside factors
Regulatory factors
Other
Organisational influence
Resource
Management
Organisational
Climate
Organisational
Process
Unsafe leadership
Inadequate
Leadership
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Failed to correct
problem
Leadership violations
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Observations
11
3
8
22
5
2
15
39
24
9
2
4

1st Tier
2nd Tier
Preconditions for unsafe act
Environmental Factors

3rd Tier

Physical environment
Technological
environment

Observations
186
53
37
16

Condition of operators
Adverse mental state
Adverse physiological
state
Physical/Mental
limitations
Personnel Factors
SRM-BRM
SRM- Communication
(Inter-ship)
Personal readiness
Unsafe acts
Errors
Decision errors
Skill-based errors
Perceptual errors
Violations
Routine
Exceptional
Total

76
52
13
11
57
21
31
5
274
239
104
66
69
35
34
1
532

It should be noted that in the six cases, only environmental factors, such as weather
conditions, were identified, and no other human factor was identified. In addition, even
though all accidents involved at least two ships, human factors were only identified in
one ship, and no human factor was identified in the other ship in some cases since the
investigator could not obtain detailed information on the ship due to the reasons such
as the death of the crew, limitation of the investigation, or refusal to cooperate for the
investigation. Consequently, human factors were identified for a total of 158 ships.
The results within each layer (1st tier) will be shown in the following section.
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Eleven factors were identified at the level of outside factors, with the lowest number
of observations occupying about 2.1% of the total 532 observed factors. Outside
factors consist of regulatory factors and others. Three factors were categorised in the
regulatory factors, specifically, lack of the provision in the COLREG about the use of
Automatic Identification System (AIS), easing the requirement for mandatory pilotage
in the national legislation, and a national guide that did not reflect current
technological characteristics of AIS. In addition, eight factors were categorised in
others. Among these, six were related to VTS matters such as training of VTS
operators, procedures for information providing, and errors of the VTS operators, and
rest two factors were the arrangement of the passage and maintenance of the canal
infrastructure.

Twenty-two factors were identified at the level of organisational influence and this
accommodated 4.1 % of the total observed factors. Although there were no subcategories in the 3rd Tier in the original HFACS Coll, sub-categories were added by
the author based on the description by Chauvin et al. (2013), as shown in Table 2-2.
Table 2-2.
Result of Organisational influences
1st Tier
2nd Tier

3rd Tier

Organisational influence

Observations
22

Resource Management

5
Human resource
management
Maintenance of equipment

Organisational Climate

4
1
2

Organisational culture
Organisational Process

2
15

Organisational procedure

5

Oversight within the
organisation
Formal process

4

16

6

In resource management, human resource management includes crew training and
crew duty, and maintenance of equipment related to maintenance of onboard
equipment. The organisational climate had two factors categorised as organisational
culture, specifically, addressing fatigue and the use of AIS. Organisational procedures
include four factors related to the documentation and one factor concerning briefings.
Oversight within the organisation includes factors related to SMS and risk
management. The formal process includes factors concerning time pressure,
operational tempo, and maintenance schedule.

Thirty-nine factors were observed at the level of unsafe leadership, which occupied
7.3% of the total identified factors, and the result with an added 3rd Tier is the same as
organisational influences shown in Table 2-3.
Table 2-3.
Result of Unsafe leadership
1st Tier
2nd Tier

3rd Tier

Unsafe leadership

Observations
39

Inadequate Leadership

24
Failure to provide guidance

12

Failure to provide oversight

7

Failure to track performance

2

Failure to track qualification

3

Planned Inappropriate Operations
Inappropriate operational
planning
Inappropriate crew changing

9
6
1

Failure to provide correct
data
Failed to correct problem

2

Leadership
violations

4

Master's violation

2

Inadequate leadership consists of four sub-categories (3rd Tier). Failure to provide
guidance is the most common sub-categories in the 3rd Tier of unsafe leadership, and
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it involves the master's inappropriate instructions and the absence of the master/pilot
on the bridge. Failure to provide oversight involves the master's failure to have
oversight of the pilot, the risk assessment, and the passage plan. Failure to track
performance includes failure in tracking ship and crew performance. Finally, failure
to track qualification includes failure in tracking crew competency. The planned
inappropriate operation consists of three sub-categories. Inappropriate operational
planning includes problems with bridge member assignment, voyage plan, and
planning on the port entry. Inappropriate crew changing refers to the case that crew
changing did not take into account the expected voyage situation. Failure to provide
correct data refers to cases the company manager failed to provide correct data to the
ship. Failed to correct problem refers to cases that failed to implement measures
identified in previous accident investigations and failure to recover the problem on
equipment. Finally, the master's violation refers to the case the master violated the
company's procedures or SMS.

One hundred eighty-six factors were categorised as preconditions for unsafe acts, and
they occupied 35.0% of the total observed factors. The result with an additional 4th
Tier that represents frequently observed cases is shown in Table 2-4.
Table 2-4.
Result of Preconditions for unsafe acts
2nd Tier
3rd Tier
4th Tier
Environmental Factors
Physical environment
Low visibility
Strong current
Bright background
Adverse traffic condition
Hydrodynamic phenomenon
Heavy weather
Technological environment
Limitation of equipment
Design of equipment
Failure of equipment
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Observations
53
37
9
2
4
3
3
16
16
9
3
4

2nd Tier
3rd Tier
4th Tier
Condition of operators
Adverse mental state
Overconfidence
Distraction
Loss of situational
awareness
Preconception on traffic
situation
Other adverse mental state
factors
Adverse physiological state
Doze
Physical fatigue
Other adverse physiological
state factors
Physical/Mental limitations
Slow movement of ship
Lack of knowledge
Lack of time to respond
Personnel Factors
SRM
BRM
Communication (Inter-ship)
Personal readiness
Insufficient rest hours
Chronic sleep shortage
Total

Observations
76
52
2
25
10
7
8
13
5
5
3
11
1
8
2
57
52
21
31
5
4
1
186

It should be noted that BRM and Communication (Inter-ship), which were subcategories of Ship Resource Mismanagement (SRM), were already included in the
original HFACS Coll. The physical environment consists of sub-categories that
affected the perception of other ships, such as low visibility and bright background. In
addition, there were other factors that contribute to an obstacle or restrict the ship’s
manoeuvre, such as heavy weather and strong currents. These contain adverse traffic
situations that refer to the situation, such as congested traffic that restricts manoeuvring
options. The technological environment had sub-categories of limitation of equipment
such as delay in refreshing information on navigational equipment and restricted radar
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angle, design of equipment such as difficult to use, and failure of the equipment such
as failure on machinery and failure of the doze warning equipment.
Conditions of operator are the most common sub-categories within the level of
preconditions for unsafe acts, and among these, adverse mental state was the most
common. Distraction and loss of situational awareness were two common subcategories within the adverse mental state that led to errors in decision and perception.
In addition, other adverse mental state factors include panic, mental fatigue, and
cultural effects that lead to hesitation to act. Adverse physiological state involves
physical fatigue, doze off, and others such as illnesses. Physical/mental limitations had
sub-categories of lack of knowledge, including characteristics of equipment and rules
that led to errors in the decision making, lack of time for response, and slow movement
of the ship that was difficult to be recognised.
SRM is the most common sub-categories within the personnel factors and consists of
BRM and Communication (inter-ship). BRM includes the issue of teamwork among
the bridge member, inappropriate task allocation, and information sharing within the
ship. Communication (Inter-ship) includes misinterpretation of manoeuvring intention
done by communicating and taking time to establish communication. Personnel
readiness had relatively low observations within personnel factors and included
insufficient rest hours and chronic sleep shortage that affected the mental and
physiological conditions of the crew.

Two hundred seventy-four factors were categorised as unsafe acts, and they had the
largest number of observations accounting for 51.5% of total observed factors. The
result of unsafe acts is shown in Table 2-5.
Table 2-5.
Result of Unsafe acts
2nd Tier
3rd Tier
4th Tier
Errors
Decision errors
Failure of traffic assessment
Inappropriate collision avoidance
manoeuvre
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Observations
239
104
17
30

2nd Tier

3rd Tier

4th Tier
Inappropriate manoeuvre
Late collision avoidance manoeuvre
Other decision error
Skill-based errors
Inappropriate monitor/lookout
Inappropriate use of navigational
equipment
Other skill-based error
Perceptual errors
Late notice of other ship
Failure of notice of other ships
Other-perceptual errors

Violation
Routine
Manoeuvre violating COLREG
Other COLREG violation
Violation of STCW
Violation of master's order/SMS
Other violations
Exceptional
Use of VHF violating SMS
Total

Observations
16
13
28
66
36
18
12
69
29
19
21
35
34
7
8
6
5
8
1
1
274

Decision errors were the most common sub-categories within the errors and consisted
of four sub-categories. Failure of the traffic assessment includes errors in assessing
other ships' movement that influence the decision on own ship's manoeuvring.
Inappropriate collision avoidance manoeuvre includes cases of manoeuvre that
resulted in the collision with a specific intention to avoid collision and did not
manoeuvre to avoid a collision. Inappropriate manoeuvres included cases that led to
collision without the intention of the collision avoidance, such as position while
passing a canal, approach during the entry, and fishing operations. Other decision
errors include misjudgement of health conditions, inappropriate collision avoidance
actions such as the use of the searchlight, and over speed. Within the skill-based error,
inappropriate monitor/lookout was the most common factor. Inappropriate use of
navigational equipment includes errors in radar setting and AIS. Other skill-based
errors include failure to manoeuvre and use of equipment other than navigational
equipment. Among perceptual errors, a late notice of other ships is the most common
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factor and refers to the cases the notice of other ships was too late for collision
avoidance. While the failure of notice of other ships refers to the cases in which the
ship did not recognise the other ship until the collision. Other perceptual errors include
errors in recognising the collision risk and environmental conditions. Violations were
observed relatively lower than errors, and most of them are categorised as routine.
Among them, manoeuvre violating COLREG, such as manoeuvring head-on and the
crossing situation, and other violations of COLREG, such as over speed and use of the
ship's whistle, were common. In addition, violations of International Convention on
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), such as
the assignment of a lookout and watch handover, and violation of master's order/SMS,
including violation of master's standing and night order and company's procedure,
were also common. Other violations include violation of the local traffic rule and
national legislation. Finally, an exceptional violation was identified in only one case,
namely the use of Very High Frequency (VHF), which violates the company's internal
rule based on SMS.
Focusing on sub-categories in 3rd Tiers, decision errors (104), perceptual errors (69),
skill-based error (66), adverse mental states (52), and SRM (52) were the five common
factors that accounted for 65.3% of the total identified factors. Therefore, although it
is important to consider the relations of each factor, especially looking into the higher
level, it is effective to consider the effects of introducing MASS on these factors when
analysing the effects of MASS on collision accidents.

In terms of the distribution of the levels of factors, outside factors, organisational
influences, and unsafe leadership were observed in relatively low numbers compared
to the other two levels. This distribution of the levels also seems common in studies
addressing other domains that utilised HAFCS and it might be due to characteristics
of available data sources rather than the features of accident causation (Hulme et al.,
2019). Focusing on organisational factors, although the importance of organisational
factors has been highlighted, accident investigation might not be conducted at this
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level (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011; Chauvin et al., 2013; Uğurlu et al., 2018).
Although this study is not intended to evaluate the quality of the accident investigation
report, the volume of each report had a broad range from several to dozen pages.
2.2.3. SHEL results
The identified (human) factors were also categorised by the SHEL model. Each SHEL
category's number of observations with the distribution within the level of HFACS,
such as unsafe acts, is shown in Table 2-6.
Table 2-6.
Overview of the SHEL result
SHEL categories

Observations
Total
OF
OI
UL
PU
UA
L-S
34
1
20
8
5
0
L-L
95
0
0
22
56
17
L-H, (H)
9
0
0
0
9
0
L-H
36
0
1
2
4
29
L-E, (E-H)
21
0
0
0
21
0
L-E
119
6
0
0
34
79
L
202
0
0
0
53
149
(S-H)
4
3
1
0
0
0
(S)
6
0
0
6
0
0
(H)
6
1
1
0
4
0
Note. Abbreviations in the table are the following; OF: Outside factors, OI:
Organisational influence, UL: Unsafe leadership, PU: Precondition for unsafe acts,
and UA: Unsafe acts.
Categories with brackets mean that these are not originally defined in the SHEL model.
This is because some factors seem not comfortable for original categories, and it would
be more applicable to add some categories than using only original categories. L is the
most common category, followed by L-E and L-L, respectively. Compared to these
categories, L-S and L-H are relatively less frequently observed. The detailed results of
each category will be shown in the following sections.

The first category is software related factors. Among all identified factors, 34 factors
and six factors were categorised as L-S and S, respectively. The result of L-S factors
is shown in Table 2-7.

23

Table 2-7.
L-S result
HFACS
Outside factors

Factors

Relived requirement for mandatory pilotage
Organisational influence
Training, crew duty
Safety culture (fatigue)
Problem on documentation
Time pressure/operational tempo
Unsafe leadership
Lack of risk assessment
Didn't have the master onboard
Inappropriate crew changing
Master's violation
Preconditions for unsafe acts
Insufficient rest hours

Observations
1
4
1
5
5

3
1
1
4
5

L-S factors were most frequently observed at the organisational influence level, while
no factors were observed at the level of the unsafe acts. In addition, all factors that
were categorised as S were unsafe leadership and involved inappropriate voyage
planning, failure to provide correct data, and failure to implement measures identified
from the previous accident investigations. These factors seem to be more softwarerelated, such as procedures, than the interaction between software and liveware;
therefore, these were categorised as S in this study.

The second category is hardware-related factors. Thirty-six factors were categorised
as L-H; in addition, nine and six factors were categorised as L-H, (H), and H,
respectively. Furthermore, four factors were categorised as S-H. The result of L-H
factors is shown in Table 2-8.
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Table 2-8.
L-H result
HFACS
Factors
Organisational influence
Safety culture (equipment)
Unsafe leadership
Failure to track ship performance
Failure to correct problem on equipment
Preconditions for unsafe acts
Design of equipment
Preconception on equipment
Unsafe acts
Failure to manage equipment
Inappropriate use of navigational equipment
Inappropriate use of equipment

Observations
1
1
1
3
1
3
22
4

L-H factors were most frequently observed at the level of unsafe acts level, such as
inappropriate use of navigational equipment, while no factors were identified at the
level of the outside factors. In addition, a new category named L-H (H) was adopted
with nine observations. This category was found at the level of the precondition for
unsafe acts and consists of technical limitations of equipment, for example, data update
periods of AIS and limitation of radar angle. These affect the liveware and have L-H
characteristics; however, these are also issues on the hardware itself; therefore, these
factors are categorised as L-H (H). Furthermore, six factors consist of failure of
equipment such ss blackout of the ship and machinery failure whose causes were
unknown, were categorised as H since these seem a purely Hardware aspect. Finally,
three factors at the level of outside factors and one factor at the level of organisational
influence were categorised as S-H. These consist of regulatory issues related to
hardware, arrangement of passage, and resource management issues related to
equipment There seems to be an interaction between software and hardware; therefore,
these were categorised as S-H.

The third category is environment-related factors. One hundred nineteen factors and
21 factors were categorised as L-E and L-E (E-H), respectively. The result of L-E
factors is shown in Table 2-9.
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Table 2-9.
L-E result
HFACS
Factors
Outside factors
Issues on VTS operation
Preconditions for unsafe acts
Visibility
Loss of situational awareness
Slow movement of ship
Unsafe acts
Failure of traffic assessment
Late notice of other ships

Observations
6
16
17
1
17
62

L-E factors were most frequently observed at the level of unsafe acts, such as late
notice of other ships, while no factors were identified at the levels of organisational
influence and unsafe leadership. Although VTS issues contain several aspects such as
the issues on the officer in VTS, procedure, and coordination, in this study VTS related
issues on the VTS side were simplified and categorised as L-E since these are
surroundings that affect the seafarers' actions (Hasanspahić et al., 2021). In addition,
21 factors at the level of the precondition for unsafe acts, such as heavy weather and
strong currents, were categorised as L-E (E-H). These factors are natural phenomena
that mainly affect the ship's manoeuvrability and seem to have characteristics such as
interaction issues between environment and hardware as well as the interaction
between environment and liveware; therefore, these were categorised as L-E (E-H).

The final category is liveware. This consist of liveware (human) itself and its
interaction. Two hundred two factors were categorised as L, and the result is shown in
Table 2-10, and 95 factors were categorised as L-L, and the result is shown in Table
2-11.
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Table 2-10.
L result
HFACS
Factors
Preconditions for unsafe acts
Distraction, stress
Fatigue, dozing off
Lack of knowledge
Unsafe acts
Inappropriate collision avoidance manoeuvre
Inappropriate monitor/lookout
Actions violating COLREG and other rules

Observations
30
13
10
78
42
29

L factors were only observed at the levels of the precondition for unsafe acts and
unsafe acts, involving factors that seem to directly contribute to the occurrence of
collision accidents.
Table 2-11.
L-L result
HFACS
Factors
Unsafe leadership
Inappropriate instruction
Failure to check crew condition
Failure to track crew performance/competency
Inappropriate bridge member assignment
Preconditions for unsafe acts
Cultural effect of bridge member
BRM, Inter-ship communication
Unsafe acts
Inappropriate passage agreement
Failure to communicate VTS
Master was not called
Watch handover

Observations
12
4
4
2
4
52
6
2
8
1

L-L factors were most frequently observed at the level of Preconditions for unsafe acts
such as BRM and Inter-ship communication, while there were no factors at the levels
of Outside factors and Organisational influence.
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3. Capability of MASS on collision avoidance
3.1. MASS architecture
3.1.1. Degree of autonomy of MASS
The characteristics of MASS highly depends on its degree of autonomy, which is the
role of humans and the system in decision-making and control. Several definitions of
the degree of autonomy have been proposed by classification societies such as DNV
GL (DNV GL, 2018) and Lloyd’s Register (Lloyd’s Register, 2017) and the industry
sector. The IMO also adopted the definition of the degree of autonomy for the purpose
of the RSE (IMO, 2021), which is shown in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1.
Degree of autonomy adopted by the IMO for RSE
Seafarer
Autonomy
Control
on board
Degree 1 (D1): Ship with
On board, seafarers operate and
automated processes and
Yes
control the ship, while some
decision support
processes are automated.
Degree 2 (D2): Remotely
The ship is remotely controlled from
controlled ship with seafarers Yes
another location, and seafarers are on
on board
board to take control.
Degree 3 (D3): Remotely
The ship is remotely controlled from
controlled ship without
No
another location, and no seafarers are
seafarers on board
on board.
Degree 4 (D4): Fully
The action of the ship is decided by
No
autonomous ship
its operating system.
It should be noted that the level of autonomy can be varied during the voyage or
operation (Ramos et al., 2019). For example, the ship without onboard seafarers
navigates fully autonomously in open water but is remotely controlled from shore
when the ship navigates in a certain challenging condition, such as navigating in a high
traffic density area, which in this case, the level of autonomy of the ship is D3 or D4
depending on the situation. In this study, the degree of autonomy that was adopted by
the IMO is adopted.
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3.1.2. Collision avoidance system of MASS
A ship is composed of complex systems, in which each has a function, such as
navigation, communication, and cargo storage/handling. Regarding systems that are
related to collision avoidance, Zhang et al. (2021) highlighted five systems: global
route optimization, navigational situational awareness, navigation behavioural
decision making, motion control and execution, and communication. The global route
optimization system refers to the system used to find the route from the starting point
to the destination, which is collision-free and shortest based on acquired environment
information such as obstacles and bad weather. The navigational situational awareness
system consists of several means of sensors and equipment to attain internal and
external information, which is the basis for navigational behavioural decision-making
and motion control. The navigational decision-making system is the core of the MASS
system, which receives input from the navigational situational awareness system and
gives the instruction to the motion control and execution system as the output. The
control and execution system executes the instruction from the decision-making
system mainly through the control engine and rudder. Finally, communication systems
share data and information between MASS, other ships, and shoreside facilities, which
are necessary for systems to work properly. In addition to the above systems, the Shore
Control Centre (SCC) has an important system. SCC has functions that the operator
can monitor, supervise or control MASS from there (Wróbel et al., 2018a).
Furthermore, the system of SCC allows the operator to monitor multiple ships
(Burmeister et al., 2014).

3.2. Collision-related issues on MASS
3.2.1. Hardware
The first category that has challenges in terms of collision-related issues of MASS is
hardware. This includes equipment utilized for the perception of other ships and the
ship itself, communication, and other equipment. Except for D1 of MASS, the
perception of other ships mainly relies on onboard sensors, even the D2 and D3 of
MASS in which the final decision maker is a human, and the decision is taken by the
person who is present in a place other than the onboard ship where the situation is not
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directly observed. This lack of the multi-sensory experience of living humans brings
uncertainties to the safety of MASS navigation (Hogg & Ghosh, 2016). Data acquired
by sensors is used for developing the situational awareness of the onboard system or
the shoreside operator. Therefore, the failure of sensors lead to the system or operator
‘blind’ and hinder them from performing the navigation process safely and efficiently
(Wróbel et al., 2018b). Therefore, sensors are one of the critical elements for collision
avoidance abilities of MASS in terms of hardware.

Sensors are categorized mainly into two depending on target data, firstly, data related
to the external condition, which consists of lookout data and external environment
data, and, secondly, data related to the internal state of the ship (Dreyer & Oltedal,
2019). Lookout data involves data used for the observation of the other ships, land,
and wreckages and is used for collision avoidance. This data will be obtained by
several sensors such as radar, video camera, AIS, and infrared camera and integrated
by the system as a perceived model containing various information such as the track
and navigational status (Burmeister et al., 2014). External environment data such as
weather conditions are also important data since these influence the Closest Point of
Approach (CPA), which is the critical value for collision avoidance (Wróbel et al.,
2018b). Weather data can be obtained by onboard sensors (Burmeister et al., 2015)
and also be provided by outside sources for the purpose of enhancing situational
awareness (Wróbel et al., 2018a). Internal system data involves data obtained by
sensors for machinery, rudder angle, tank gauges, and fire (Dreyer & Oltedal, 2019;
Wróbel et al., 2018b). One of the concerns is the accuracy of the onboard sensor system
to detect small objects such as a life raft, wreckage, or people in all weather conditions
(Hogg & Ghosh, 2016).

In addition to sensors, the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is also
important hardware that is related to perception. MASS is expected to gain its position
information from GNSS, which is known as an accurate and reliable position system;
however, threats to GNSS have been raised recently (Felski & Zwolak, 2020).
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Although there are several types of threats to GNSS, jamming is considered a major
threat that is mainly caused by military and illegal fishery activities (Medina et al.,
2019). This is also related to cyber security issues, which will be addressed in this
section. In addition to intentional malicious interference, unintentional radio frequency
interference can also be caused by equipment such as commercial high-power
transmitters, ultra-wideband radar, television, VHF, mobile satellite services, and
personal electronic devices (Felski & Zwolak, 2020). Although it is an area-specific
issue, the Arctic region, which is currently attractive as a new maritime traffic route
connecting the Atlantic and the Pacific, is a challenging area for the use of GNSS
because of signal blockage caused by the low elevated angle of satellite position, and
signal scintillation and delay caused by ionospheric disturbance (Yastrebova et al.,
2020).

The second category which involves challenges within the hardware aspect is
communication. The architecture of communication of MASS needs to be safe and
reliable and mainly be categorized into “ship-to-shore” and “ship-to-ship” (Dreyer &
Oltedal, 2019). Ship-to-shore communication includes both-way communication
between MASS and SCC mainly utilizing satellite communication links with other
short-range communication links as supplementary (Rødseth & Burmeister, 2015;
Wróbel et al., 2018b); in the case of D2 or D3 of MASS, MASS sends the observed
data to SCC and the operator in SCC makes the decision and sends the controlling
signal to MASS. The communication link should have a fail-safe backup in case of
communication failure and other reasons (Wróbel et al., 2018b). Ship-to-ship
communication includes communication between MASS and conventionally manned
ships (Hogg & Ghosh, 2016; Rødseth & Burmeister, 2015) and others such as VTS
(Thieme et al., 2018).

One of the challenges in communication is bandwidth and the qualities of
communication. Although the communication from MASS to SCC is mainly status
update, including radar, Global Positioning System (GPS), and rudder data which
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needs relatively low-quality communication architecture, high bandwidths and highquality communication architecture are essential to in case such as SCC requires highdefinition video images or SCC takes control of MASS (Hogg & Ghosh, 2016). In
addition, satellite communication systems and other communication-related systems,
such as communication devices in SCC, have a high potential to be affected by cyber
threats (Tusher et al., 2022). On the other hand, communication between MASS and
conventionally manned ships may also have a challenge since communication has been
traditionally executed by humans on each bridge (Dreyer & Oltedal, 2019).

Finally, the reliability of the equipment can also be a challenge in the hardware aspect.
This is not only for collision avoidance but also for the safety of navigation of MASS
in general. In particular, there will be no crew on board for D3 and D4 of MASS, which
means that onboard repair by the crew cannot be executed as well as emergency
response activities for the event such as in case of fire. This can bring severe
consequences than that of conventionally manned ships (Wróbel et al., 2017).
Therefore, more reliability is required for equipment used in MASS compared to
conventionally manned ships (Hogg & Ghosh, 2016). In addition, self-monitoring is
also important for D3 or D4 of MASS since there is no crew on board who checks the
condition of the system on board (Felski & Zwolak, 2020).
3.2.2. Software
There are also challenges in the software aspect. These involve decision-making, cyber
security, and validation. Firstly, decision-making is the major challenge that involves
collision avoidance manoeuvres such as head-on or crossing situations with other ships
and avoidance of unfavourable weather conditions as weather routine (Burmeister et
al., 2015). Decision-making of MASS for collision avoidance is one of the major
research areas of MASS. There are mainly two categories of collision avoidance
algorism: rule-based and learning-algorism based. Rule-based algorisms divide
actions of MASS into each behaviour which is determined by rule logic based on
CORLREGs, other traffic rules, knowledge, and experience. Learning-algorism-based
methods include deep-learning-related methods and machine learning-based methods.
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The rule-based algorism has advantages such as clear logic, strong interpretability, and
ease of model, while it has disadvantages such as concerns in the overlapping of trigger
conditions which lead to system failure, and bottleneck for complex conditions. On
the other hand, the learning-algorism-based method has the advantage of its
applicability to various situations through big data systems and possible simplification
with a network structure, while it has disadvantages in poor interpretability. This will
lead to difficulty in modifying the model and the quality of the model depends on data
quality. Currently, the rule-based algorithm is widely adopted, and a combination of
the rule-based and the learning- algorithm based will be more used (Zhang et al.,
2021).

Although the future application of existing regulations to MASS is under discussion,
COLREGs should still be referred to collision avoidance manoeuvres of MASS (IMO,
2021). Therefore, irrespective of algorithms, the decision-making should align with
COLREGs. COLREGs consist of 41 regulations that are divided into six parts: Part A
- General; Part B - Steering and Sailing; Part C - Lights and Shapes; Part D - Sound
and Light signals; Part E - Exemptions; and Part F - Verification of compliance with
the provisions of the Convention (IMO, 1972). Among these, Part B deals with
collision avoidance actions applied in all conditions and certain conditions, such as
overtaking (Rule 13), head-on (Rule 14), and crossing (Rule 15), and plays an
important role in decision-making for collision avoidance; therefore, the collision
avoidance algorithms have mainly been discussed in Part B of COLREGs (Burmeister
& Constapel, 2021).

Challenges in decision-making for collision avoidance are mainly divided into two
categories: interaction against ships whose intentions are unclear or do not act per
COLREGs, and interpretation is derived from the text of COLERGs. The first category
is significant for the situation where MASS and conventionally manned ships co-exist.
Since MASS is always expected to follow a collision avoidance algorithm if the system
works properly, conventionally manned ships might act unpredictably and violate
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rules (Felski & Zwolak, 2020). For example, even the system that shows good
capability for collision avoidance in several situations, the unclear intention of the
other ship under high-speed and close range is a challenging situation for the system
(Kufoalor et al., 2020).

The second category, interpretation derived from the text of COLERGs, is challenging
in the stage of software development for collision avoidance. In general, COLREGs
have a qualitative nature, and the application of COLREGs is judged by seafarers
taking into account not only the actual situation but their knowledge, experience, and
culture (Porathe, 2019); therefore, the application of COLREGs has some subjectivity
(Ramos et al., 2019). One of the examples is Rule 2, which requires seafarers to adhere
to regulations of COLREGs, while it also regulates seafarers to deviate from rules if it
is necessary to avoid accidents. However, there is no clear indication about the
condition, such as distance or time, which should deviate from the rules in the
COLREGs (Porathe, 2019).

The second category of challenge in decision-making is avoiding unfavourable
weather conditions. As shown in the result of the HFACS coding of accident reports
in chapter 2, heavy weather can be one of the contributing factors to collisions. In
addition, this is also related to comprehensive navigation safety of MASS since if
MASS encounters unfavourable weather conditions, damages to the hull, cargo, and
environment may happen (Acanfora et al., 2018). The decision-making for avoiding
unfavourable weather conditions consists of two stages, planning and operation. The
planning stage mainly considers the route based on the weather forecast provided by
the shoreside, while the operational stage mainly considers manoeuvres that try to
reduce negative effects from the external environment based on locally observed
environment data (Acanfora et al., 2018; Burmeister et al., 2015). It should be noted
that the manoeuvre for collision avoidance and the manoeuvre for unfavourable
weather conditions cannot be solved independently, and contradiction may happen
(Burmeister et al., 2015).
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The second major challenge in the software aspect is cyber security. Recently, cyber
security is one of the major issues in the maritime industry, and it can also be a major
threat to MASS (Ghaderi, 2019; Hogg & Ghosh, 2016). Furthermore, not only MASS
but also threats to infrastructures exist in the offshore and coastal areas since hijacked
MASS can be used for attacking these infrastructures (Vinnem & Utne, 2018).
Regardless of its degree of autonomy, MASS increases dependencies on Information
and Communication Technology (ICT) for ship control and monitoring connectivity
between the ship and shore, and accessibility to the ship system through the internet
also increases (Katsikas, 2017).

Several threats to MASS both on board and shoreside exist, and previous studies on
cyber security in the maritime domain mainly categorize it into five; “navigational
systems, propulsion control systems, port operations, shore control centre and shorebased management offices” (Tusher et al., 2022, p. 5). Navigational equipment
includes GNSS, AIS, and Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS),
which are widely used on board and can be subjected to cyber-attacks since these work
based on signal processing and transmission (Dyryavyy (2015) as cited in Tusher et
al., 2022). Jamming and spoofing are major types of cyber-attacks on navigational
equipment. While it requires a relatively higher level of technologies than jamming,
spoofing, which introduces false signals to equipment and leads to faults such as
calculating incorrect position or timing, can bring more severe consequences since
spoofing confuses even the alarm system for jamming (Androjna et al., 2020). Since
the dependency on navigational equipment of MASS is higher than on conventionally
manned ships, the consequences of cyber-attacks also become severe. Propulsion
systems also have a vulnerability against cyber-attacks since advanced propulsion
systems utilize information and communication technologies (Tusher et al., 2022).
Although the estimated risk for the cyber security of the engine-related system is
relatively lower than that of the bridge system (Kavallieratos et al., 2019), the effect
of propulsion failure on collision avoidance should be considered. Port operations are
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also exposed to cyber threats in the area, such as Port Community Systems and
Maritime Single Window. In addition, mooring operations can also be subjected to
cyber threats since modern mooring technologies utilize remote radio control (Tusher
et al., 2022). Although these are less significant for collision avoidance, they still
possibly contribute to collision accidents during port entry/departure in terms of
information sharing. The SCC is the core of the MASS operation. However, due to the
lack of a common understanding of the necessary system architecture for future
MASS, identifying cyber threats on SCC is challenging (Tusher et al., 2022). Some
potential cyber threats on SCC were identified, such as compromising credential or
administration access and losing connection capability (Kavallieratos et al., 2019).
Since SCC has a critical role, ensuring safety and redundancy on SCC is important for
collision avoidance. The final category of cyber threats is threats in shore-based
management offices. The reliance on the internet has also increased in shoreside
management offices, and potential vulnerability also exists in shore-based
management offices. Furthermore, major shipping companies and the IMO have in
fact suffered from cyber-attacks (Tusher et al., 2022). The same as the cyber threats
in port operations, cyber threats in shoreside management offices are less significant
in collision avoidance in direct aspects; however, these might have an effect on
collision accidents as “latent factors” in the Swiss cheese model.

Finally, validation of the system is also a challenge in the software aspect. This can
also be a challenge in the hardware aspect in terms of the overall collision avoidance
system. MASS needs high reliability in all expected circumstances; therefore,
validation of the system is very important. According to a recent review (Burmeister
& Constapel, 2021), recent studies on collision avoidance of MASS have mainly
adopted special simulation environments as validation methods which might be
different from a commercial ship-handling simulator or field test in terms of
hydrodynamic characteristics in manoeuvre. In addition, while the developments of
preliminary classification society rules were acknowledged, the lack of internationally
accepted or standardized process methods was also highlighted.
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3.2.3. Human factor
Human factors are also a challenge for collision avoidance of MASS. Even with an
increased degree of autonomy of MASS, which means reduced human involvement,
human factors still exist, such as SCC and the navigation environment where MASS
and other ships are mixed. For SCC, human factor-related challenges involve the
operator and human-machine interaction. Although the operator in SCC will be free
from fatigue and other adverse working conditions, which are expected to mitigate
human errors compared to working onboard (Burmeister et al., 2014), operational
errors can still happen with the operator. For example, Liu et al. (2022) highlighted
that performing continuous collision avoidance during the voyage, system setting and
updating before departure, and reporting to relevant authorities when arrival as the
critical tasks of the operator which expects high error probability for the operation of
degree three of autonomy of MASS. In addition, the risk of monitoring several ships
by one operator is also highlighted (Zhang et al., 2020). Even for a high degree of
autonomy of MASS, the human operator in SCC is still important as a safety barrier
for collision avoidance systems of MASS. For example, intervention in the system by
the operator can happen when the system cannot find a solution for collision avoidance
and warns to the operator or the operator noticed the failure of systems (Ramos et al.,
2019). Therefore, errors with the operator can lead to severe consequences. With
regards to this, training and qualification for the operator are also challenges. The
operator will be required new skills to manage the ship and analyse the data in addition
to the experience at sea (Hogg & Ghosh, 2016) Therefore, the qualification for the
operator needs to be regulated through open discussion between stakeholders (Felski
& Zwolak, 2020).

Another challenge is Human-machine interaction. This contains several types of
negative effects. One of the examples is automation-induced complacency, which
means the inability of the operator to perceive an automation malfunction of the
system, which is affected by the training and workload experience of the operator and
the reliability of the automation system. This is also related to the optimization of trust
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and dependency on the system. Excessive trust leads to over-reliance, while lack of
trust leads to the disuse of the system (Hogg & Ghosh, 2016). Another example is the
situational awareness of the operator. There is a concern that the situational awareness
of the operator might be limited due to the lack of sense of the ship, together with
information overload from multiple sensors on board the ship (Ghaderi, 2019).

In addition to issues on SCC, the interaction between MASS and conventionally
manned ships is one of the major challenges of MASS operation (Chang et al., 2021).
Although the automated system has an advantage in performing repetitive tasks in
terms of reliability compared to a human, there is a concern that the automated system
may not make the decision that is adopted to complex and unpredictable situations as
humans do (Kim et al., 2022). In terms of collision avoidance, the violation of
COLREGs and other rules by conventionally manned ships (with the assumption that
MASS always adheres to these), which is also found in the results of the HFACS
coding of accident investigation reports, helps make the situation more complex and
unpredictable. In addition, not only inter-ship relations but also the relation to VTS
under a mixed navigational environment need to be taken into account (Baldauf et al.,
2019). Furthermore, according to Kim et al. (2022), the risk matrix for the mixed
navigational environment, which involves conventionally manned ships and MASS,
shows that an increase in diversity of degree of autonomy leads to more likelihood and
severity. Therefore, navigational situations in the near future can be more challenging.
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4. Effects of introduction of MASS on collision accident
4.1. Methodology
Based on the analysis of collision accident investigation reports and a literature review
on the capability of collision avoidance of MASS, the effect of the introduction of
MASS on collision accidents was evaluated. More specifically, for each identified and
categorized human factor, the likelihood was evaluated corresponding to the degree of
autonomy of MASS which was adopted by the IMO. In addition, the Likert scale was
adopted for the evaluation of the likelihood since it is a widely adopted method for
quantifying subjective thinking in a reliable manner (Joshi et al., 2015). The original
likelihoods were developed by the author and were validated by the three experts of
the WMU. The experts are faculty members, have experience working at sea, and have
engaged in research areas which are related to this study such as maritime safety and
MASS. The opinions of the experts were equally considered since the number of the
experts was low and they belonged to the same organization.

4.2. Result
In this section, the result of likelihood is presented after a brief introduction to basic
considerations which lead to the result. Firstly, the likelihood was set from 1 to 5, 1
means very rare and 5 means very often, and 3 means as usual as the conventionally
manned ship. The result of the likelihood of each factor corresponds to each degree of
autonomy of MASS, D1 to D4. Secondly, the likelihood was developed for each ship
and related outside facilities. In other words, the likelihood was developed as a “ship
perspective” in general; therefore, matters such as the effects of MASS and
conventionally manned ships mixed navigational environment on VTS operation were
not taken into account. Thirdly, it should be noted about the overall assumption that
MASS should be at least as safe as conventionally manned ships (Thieme et al., 2018).
Therefore, human factor related issues should also be reduced in general. For example,
matters related to the onboard crew’s health will completely be eliminated with D4 of
MASS which is a completely automated ship. In addition, the operator in SCC will be
provided with a better environment than that of an onboard bridge and it will be
expected to mitigate adverse conditions such as stress (Burmeister et al., 2014).
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However, factors related to the outside of MASS and SCC such as the company and
other shore authorities will not be significantly affected by the introduction of MASS.
This will also be applicable for matters not directly related to humans such as
procedures and equipment. Finally, the reliability of systems utilised in MASS was
assumed relatively high compared to conventionally manned ships. Although there are
several challenges on MASS systems as highlighted in chapter 3 of this study, the
measure to ensure redundancy of the system or the highly reliable system will be
adopted as the risk control measures (Wróbel et al., 2018b). Therefore, factors related
to the system reliability were considered as very rare to happen. In other words, the
system will not make a mistake on decision or violate rules in general. Based on the
above consideration, the result of developed likelihood is shown in Table 4-1 with the
referencing HFACS Coll and SHEL categories.
Table 4-1.

Likelihood of each factor
HFACS
1st
2nd
3rd
SHEL
Tiers
Tiers Tier
Outside factors
Regulatory factors
(S-H)
L-S
(S-H)

Likelihood
Factors

No provision exists for
AIS data
Relived requirement
for mandatory pilotage
Not reflect current
technical situation

D1

D2

D3

D4

3

3

3

3

3

3

1

1

3

3

3

3

3

3

2

2

3

3

2

2

3

3

3

2

3

2

2

1

Other
(S-H)
(H)
L-E
Organizational influence
Resource management
L-S

Inappropriate
arrangement of passage
Insufficient
maintenance of canal
infrastructure
Issues on VTS
operation

Training, crew duty
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1st
Tiers

HFACS
2nd
Tiers

Likelihood
3rd
Tier

SHEL

(S-H)
Organizational climate
L-S
L-H

Factors
Insufficient
maintenance of
equipment
Safety culture (fatigue)
Safety culture
(equipment)

D1

D2

D3

D4

3

3

2

2

3

3

2

1

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

2

2

3

3

3

2

2

2

2

1

2

2

2

1

2

2

1

1

2

2

2

1

2

2

2

1

2

2

1

1

3

2

1

1

3

2

2

1

3

2

1

1

3

1

1

1

3

3

2

2

Organizational Process
L-S
L-S
(H)
L-S

Problem on
documentation
Ineffective
SMS/oversight
Inappropriate
repair/maintenance
Time
pressure/operational
tempo

Unsafe leadership
Inadequate Leadership
Inappropriate
instruction
L-S
Lack of risk assessment
Failure to check crew
L-L
condition
Failure to track ship
L-H
performance
Failure to track crew
L-L
performance
Failure to track crew
L-L
competency/qualificati
on
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Inappropriate bridge
L-L
member assignment
Inappropriate voyage
(S)
plan
Didn't have the master
L-S
onboard
Inappropriate crew
L-S
changing
Failure to provide
(S)
correct data
L-L
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1st
Tiers

HFACS
2nd
3rd
SHEL
Tiers Tier
Failed to correct problem
(S)

L-H

Likelihood
Factors

Failure to implement
measures identified
previous accident
investigation
Failure to correct
problem on equipment

Leadership violations
L-S
Master's violation
Precondition for unsafe acts
Environmental Factors
Physical environment
L-E
Visibility
L-E,
heavy weather, strong
(E-H)
current
Technological environment
L-H,
Limitation of
(H)
equipment
L-H
Design of equipment
(H)
Failure of equipment
Condition of operators
Adverse mental state
L
Distraction, stress
Cultural effect of
L-L
bridge member
Loss of situational
L-E
awareness
Preconception on
L-H
equipment
Adverse physiological state
L
Fatigue, doze off
Physical/Mental limitations
L-E
Slow movement of ship
L
Lack of knowledge
Personnel Factors
SRM
L-L
BRM
Inter-ship
L-L
communication
Personal readiness
L-S
Insufficient rest hours
Unsafe acts
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D1

D2

D3

D4

3

3

3

3

3

3

2

2

3

2

2

1

2

1

1

1

2

2

1

1

3

3

3

3

3
3

2
3

2
2

1
2

3

2

2

1

3

1

1

1

3

2

2

1

3

2

2

1

3

2

2

1

3
3

2
2

2
2

1
1

3

2

2

1

3

3

3

4

3

2

2

1

1st
Tiers

HFACS
2nd
Tiers
Errors

Likelihood
3rd
Tier

SHEL

Factors

D1

D2

D3

D4

3

2

2

1

3

2

2

1

3

2

2

1

3

2

2

1

3

2

2

1

3

3

1

1

3

2

2

1

3

2

1

1

3

2

1

1

3

2

2

1

3

2

2

1

3

2

2

1

3

2

2

1

3

2

2

1

Decision error
L
L-E
L-L
L-H

Inappropriate collision
avoidance manoeuvre
Failure of traffic
assessment
Inappropriate passage
agreement
Failure to manage
equipment

Skill-based error
L
L-L
L-H

Inappropriate
monitor/lookout
Failure to communicate
VTS
Inappropriate use of
navigational equipment

Perceptual error
L-E
L-L

Late notice of other
ships
Master was not called

Violation
Routine
L
L-H
L-E
L-L
Exceptional
L-H

Actions violating
COLREG and other
rules
Inappropriate use of
equipment
Late perception of
other ships
Watch handover
Inappropriate use of
equipment

In addition, the aggregated likelihood compared to the current conventionally manned
ship was calculated as the following formula; where, Pn means aggregated likelihood
corresponding to each degree of autonomy of MASS (n=1 to 4); pn means likelihood
for each human factors corresponding to each degree of autonomy of MASS (n=1 to
4).
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𝑝𝑛
3
Since pn set as 3 if the likelihood of each human factor is the same as conventionally
𝑃𝑛 = ∑

manned ship, Pn is 1 if each likelihood is the same as conventionally manned ship. The
result of Pn is shown in Table 4-2.
Table 4-2.
Aggregated likelihood
D1
0.954

D2
0.770

D3
0.661

D4
0.500

In terms of likelihood, there is no significant difference for D1. However, for D4, the
likelihood is reduced to half compared to conventionally manned ships.
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5. Discussion
5.1. Accidents distribution
In this section, the findings from the analysis of accident investigation reports are
discussed. The first finding is features of factors identified through the coding of
accident investigation reports. In this study, the scope of collision accidents was set to
the accidents involving a container ship. Therefore, it was expected that some factors,
which seemed to be related to the container ship or its operation, would be identified
through the coding of the accident investigation reports. For example, one of the
features of liner shipping is the high demand for the punctuality of the operation (Ma,
2021) and this can lead to factors such as time pressure and inappropriate voyage
planning. Another example is the design features of the ship, which are related to
stability and involve hull form, draft, and length, and directly affect ship motion. Ship
motion might cause motion-induced sickness and motion-induced interruption of tasks
and these negative effects are relatively common in container ships compared to other
ship types such as tankers (Endrina et al., 2019). However, a few factors, which seem
related to the container ship or its operation, were identified through the coding of
investigation reports. For example, time pressure and design issues of equipment are
categorized as formal process and technological environment in HFACS Coll
classification (Chauvin et al., 2013); six of formal process factors and 16 of
technological environment factors were observed respectively among 532 factors
totally. These factors are considered as “latent” factors which might lead to unsafe acts
such as decision or skill-based errors.

The second finding is the distribution of the identified factors in the categories of
HFACS. In particular, a relatively low number of factors categorized for outside
factors, organisational influences, and unsafe leadership were observed. This the
relatively low observations of factors at outside factors, organisational influences, and
unsafe supervision levels are also common in other studies which adopted HFACS,
and this might be led by data source, i.e., accident investigation reports, rather than the
features of accident causation (Hulme et al., 2019). In addition, these relatively low
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observations of latent failure are also contrary to the HFACS philosophy that
emphasises to look into the latent failure of unsafe acts (Hulme et al., 2019). This
might be related to the above finding that there were few observations of container
ship related factors. The ideal principles of accident investigation are ‘What-YouLook-For-Is-What-You-Find’

followed

by

‘What-You-Find-Is-What-You-Fix’,

which means the purpose of accident investigation is to find the method to prevent
feature re-occurrence of similar accidents and found causes of the accident through the
investigation are to be fixed during follow-up (Lundberg et al., 2009). However, a
limitation was highlighted in that the investigation was stopped at the level of causes
which would be currently practically fixable, and this prevented the investigation from
understanding the overall picture of the accident as a basis for measures to prevent reoccurrence (Lundberg et al., 2010). However, available data might be limited to
conventionally manned ships since MASS is not widely operated but only a few at the
trial phase at present, so more depth and wider scoped investigation would help not
only future re-occurrence of the accident but basis for improving the safety of MASS.

5.2. Implications for maritime industries
This section discusses the challenges of collision avoidance of MASS highlighted in
chapter 3. Several key issues were highlighted such as sensors, communication, cyber
security and validation. Firstly, sensors are essential for the decision-making of MASS
not only for collision avoidance but for overall operations. Therefore, measures to
ensure the capability of sensors should be adopted. These include the adoption of
highly reliable sensors and/or measures to ensure redundancy of sensors (Wróbel et
al., 2018b). In addition, for the purpose of ease of modularized development of the
MASS system, the common definition and format for the data set of obtained data
from various sensors are also required (Burmeister et al., 2020). Furthermore, in
relation to the other factors such as communication and human factors, the
optimization of data from sensors is also necessary for the purpose of corresponding
to the issues such as limited communication capacity, information overload, and
conflicting information from different sensors (Burmeister et al., 2014).
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Communication is also one of the essential elements for the safe operation of MASS.
Although ensuring stable satellite communication with wider bandwidth is important
(Felski & Zwolak, 2020), ensuring the communication between MASS and the
conventionally manned ship is also important (Dreyer & Oltedal, 2019). Several
measures have been considered but mainly communication from MASS to other ships
utilizing for example lights and reserved AIS channels (Porathe, 2019). However, the
means to ensure communication from conventionally manned ships to MASS and
bidirectional communications also need to be developed.
Cyber security is another important element for MASS but also for the overall
maritime sector since digitalisation has increased. The IMO issued guidelines, which
provide high-level recommendations on maritime cyber risk management (IMO,
2017d), and later adopted the resolution to encourage administrations to ensure
addressing the cyber risks properly in existing company’s SMS (IMO, 2017b).
However, these are the starting point for ensuring effective cyber security measures.
Since MASS interact in the surrounding environment, including human beings,
effective and comprehensive cyber security measures are necessary for the safe
operation of MASS (Ghaderi, 2019; Katsikas, 2017).
The validation is also important for ensuring the overall safety of the MASS system.
Although the majority of studies on collision avoidance of MASS adopted the special
simulation environment (Burmeister & Constapel, 2021), a field test is preferable in
terms of validation against uncertainties in the actual operating environment. In fact,
several field tests have been conducted with large vessels and not small purpose
vessels such as a coastal ferry (Rolls-Royce, 2018), a coastal going container ship (The
Nippon Foundation, 2022) and an ocean-going LNG carrier (Hyundai Heavy
Industries Group, 2022). These works are helpful not only for the development of
technologies adopted for these projects but can also be used as a basis for the
development of internationally accepted test methods for future development of the
MASS system.

47

5.3. Future research
Finally, this section considers a future research direction on collision avoidance of
MASS. Although MASS is expected to improve the safety and efficiency of shipping
in general, the effects of the introduction of MASS on accident occurrence seem a
complex issue. For example, Wróbel et al. (2017) reviewed 100 accident investigation
reports and assessed the impact of MASS on maritime accidents under the condition
that only known issues were addressed, and excluded security issues. They concluded
that navigational accidents such as grounding and collisions are expected to decrease,
while, non-navigational accidents such as fire, are expected to be more severe since
there is no seafarer on board. Taking into account the high dependency of MASS on
ICT, the potential impacts of cyber threats (Tusher et al., 2022) should be taken into
account during future research. Furthermore, the mixed navigational environment,
which involves MASS and conventionally manned ships (Chang et al., 2021; Kim et
al., 2022), will be realized in the near future and might become the key issue for
collision avoidance of MASS. However, this topic might be challenging in terms of
uncertainties and available data sources since currently only a limited number of trials
of MASS operation have been conducted, further research on this mixed navigational
environment seems necessary.
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6. Conclusion
It is well believed that human factors contribute to about 80% of maritime accidents.
Therefore, the importance of human factors in maritime accidents has been recognised
for several decades and it has also been addressed in the area of accident investigation.
On the other hand, the rapid development of technologies brings MASS to maritime
sectors. MASS is expected to overcome issues of human errors and improve the safety
and efficiency of shipping. The motivation of this study was to answer the following
question: How does MASS affect maritime accidents? To estimate the effects of the
introduction of MASS on maritime accidents, collision accidents were adopted as a
scope of accident types. In addition, the scope of collision accidents was set to
accidents involving a container ship since it is expected that MASS will be actively
introduced to container ships. This study consisted of mainly three parts. The first part
was the analysis of accident investigation reports of 98 collision accidents utilising
HFACS Coll and the SHEL model to understand the characteristics of current collision
accidents. The second part was a literature review to understand the characteristics of
MASS in collision accidents. The third part was the assessment of the effects of
different degrees of autonomy of MASS on identified human factors utilising a Likert
scale likelihood based on the result of analysis of accident investigation reports and
literature review. The results are as follows. For the first part, from HFACS results,
decision errors, perceptual errors, skill-based errors, adverse mental states, and SRM
were major observed categories. On the other hand, from the SHEL results, L, L-E and
L-L categories were major observed categories. For the second part, three measure
categories of collision-related challenges of MASS were identified. In particular,
hardware, which involves sensors and communication; software, which involves
decision making and cyber security; and human factor, which involves issues on the
interaction between MASS and conventionally manned ships were three major
categories. For the third part, the likelihood of each human factor generally decreased
with the increased degree of autonomy of MASS. From these results, although there
were some limitations, this study could conclude that the introduction of MASS
decreases collision accidents to some extent.
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The limitation of this research and the possible future research are the following:
Firstly, the scope of accidents was limited to accidents involving container ships and
the majority of data sources relied on accidents investigated by JTSB. Secondly, this
study adopted HFACS Coll and SHEL model to analyse human factors. These methods
have an advantage in classification; however, these do not provide much information
about the interaction of each human factor. Thirdly, although the likelihood assessment
result on MASS effects on collision accidents was validated by the experts of WMU,
there were uncertainties, such as those coming from potential cyber threats and the
mixed navigational environment. In addition, the number of experts was limited and
the affiliation of experts was limited to WMU. Finally, it is important to estimate not
only the likelihood but also the consequences for assessing safety. Future research
which corresponds to the above, for example, expanding the scope of accidents,
adopting further analysis methods such as the Bayesian Network, and improving
validation methods such as adopting the workshop, would be useful for assessing a
wider picture of the effects of the introduction of MASS on maritime accidents.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 The list of analysed reports
Number

ID

1 MO-2018002

2 MAB-13-04

3

2012005988

4 7/2020

5 Investigation
Report
417/13

6 28/2015

7 MAR-20-02

8 Investigation
Report
36/14

9 Investigation
Report
53/13
10 Investigation
Report
15/13

11 Investigation
Report
507/11

Occurrence
Title
date
2018/1/23 Collision between the container
ship Beijing Bridge and fishing
vessel Saxon Onward, Tasman
Sea, about 3 NM south-east of
Gabo Island, Victoria, on 23
January 2018
2011/12/5 Collision between M/V Maersk
Wisconsin and Tug and Barge
Unit
2012/6/5 SPRING GLORY and
JOSEPHINE MAERSK Collision on 5 June 2012
2018/8/4 Collision between container
vessel ANL Wyong and gas
carrier King Arthur
2013/5/7 Collision between the CMV
CONMAR AVENUE and
CMV MAERSK KALMAR on
7 May 2013 on the Outer
Weser.
2015/2/11 Collision between container
vessel Ever Smart and oil
tanker Alexandra 1
2017/7/17 Collision between US Navy
Destroyer Fitzgerald and
Philippine-Flag Container Ship
ACX Crystal
2014/1/16 Collision between the WES
JANINE and STENBERG on
the Nordwest-Reede anchorage
off Brunsbüttel on 16 January
2014
2013/3/2 Collision in the Brunsbüttel
siding between the CMV
HERM KIEPE and CMV
EMPIRE on 2 March 2013.
2013/1/31 Collision between the MV
CORAL ACE and the MV
LISA SCHULTE at the Neue
Weser Nord-roadstead on 31
January 2013.
2011/11/22 Collision between the MOL
EFFICIENCY and the
SPLITTNES on 22 November
2011 at 2013 on the Weser.
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Country
Australia

US

Denmark

UK

Germany

UK

US

Germany

Germany

Germany

Germany

Number

ID

12 Investigation
Report
250/11

13 15/2013

14 Investigation
Report
117/11
15 Investigation
Report
211/19

16 11/2014

17 27/2011

18 20/2011

19 17/2011

20 MAB-20-19

21 MAB-16-10

22 2020tk0011

23 2018tk0004

24 2016tk0008

25 2016tk0002

Occurrence
Title
date
2011/6/21 Collision between the CMV
CCNI RIMAC and CMV
CSAV PETORCA on 21 June
2011 in the area of the
approach to the port of
Yangshan.
2011/12/11 Collision between container
vessels Hyundai Discovery and
ACX Hibiscus
2011/4/14 Collision between the
TYUMEN-2 and OOCL
FINLAND on 14 April 2011 in
the Kiel Canal.
2019/6/8 Collision between traditional
vessel No 5 ELBE and
container vessel
ASTROSPRINTER on the
River Elbe on 8 June 2019
2013/3/19 Collision between container
vessel CMA CGM Florida and
bulk carrier Chou Shan
2011/3/6 Collision between container
vessel Cosco Hongkong and
fish transportation vessel Zhe
Ling Yu Yun 135 with loss of
11 lives
2011/4/9 Collision between container
vessel Philipp and scallop
dredger Lynn Marie
2011/2/11 Collision between container
vessel Boxford and twin beam
trawler Admiral Blake
2019/3/21 Collision between
Containerships Marcliff and
APL Guam
2015/2/22 Collision between St. Louis
Express & Hammersmith
Bridge
2019/10/15 Collision between container
vessel APL PUSAN and cargo
ship Shoutoku Maru
2018/5/4 Collision between container
vessel NYK Venus and
container vessel SITC Osaka
2016/6/7 Collision between Container
Ship ESTELLE MAERSK and
Container Ship JJ SKY
2016/2/19 Collision between container
ship SINOKOR INCHEON and
fishing vessel TOSHIMARU
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Country
Germany

UK

Germany

Germany

UK

UK

UK

UK

US

US

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Number

ID

26 2014tk0009

27 2013tk0004

28 2013tk0002

29 2012tk033

30 2012tk0023

31 2012tk0003

32 2020yh0128

33 2020yh0065

34 2020yh0045

35 2020yh0022

36 2019tk0024

37 2019kb0178

38 2019kb0174

39 2019hs0132

40 2019kb0104

Occurrence
Title
date
2014/3/18 Collision between Cargo ship
BEAGLE III and Container
ship PEGASUS PRIME
2013/2/25 Collision between Container
ship, WAN HAI 162, fishing
vessel SEINAN MARU No.7
and fishing vessel SEINAN
MARU No.8
2013/1/23 Collision between container
ship BAI CHAY BRIDGE and
Fishing vessel SEIHOU MARU
No. 18
2012/7/3 Collision between Container
ship TIAN FU and Chemical
tanker SENTAIMARU
2012/8/15 Collision between Container
ship YONG CAI and Fishing
vessel SHINYOMARU No.2
2012/2/7 Collision between Container
ship KOTA DUTA and Cargo
ship TANYA KARPINSKAYA
2020/9/4 Collision between container
ship PANCON GLORY and
fishing vessels Nisshou Maru
No.1 and No.12
2020/6/18 Collision between container
ship POS YOKOHAMA and
cargo ship Kinei Maru No.22
2020/4/25 Collision between container
ship JEJU ISLAND and cargo
ship MADOKAMIYA
2020/1/10 Collision between container
ship Kouryu Maru and fishing
vessel Shinei Maru
2019/10/24 Collision between container
ships SITC BANGKOK and
RESURGENCE
2019/10/23 Collision between container
ship STAR PLANET and
fishing vessel Seisho Maru
No.11
2019/9/26 Collision between container
ship ONE BLUE JAY and oil
tanker GUNECE
2019/9/20 Collision between container
ship MARVEL and cargo ship
ZENITH VEGA
2019/8/8 Collision between container
ship MOL EXPLORER and
cargo ship Kyowa Maru No.3
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Country
Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Number

ID

41 2019yh0104

42 2019kb0157
43 2019hs0099

44 2019yh0084

45 2019hs0049

46 2019yh0023

47 2019kb0024

48 2019yh0017

49 2018yh0105

50 2018yh0060

51 2018mj002

52 2017mj0122

53 2016kb0135

54 2016hs0097

55 2016hs0038

Occurrence
Title
date
2019/8/2 Collision between container
ship PACIFIC BEIJING and
fishing vessels Shichifuku
Maru and Taihei Maru
2019/7/26 Collision between container
ships Akashi and Tamon
2019/7/12 Collision between container
ship MUSE and fishing vessel
Nao Maru
2019/6/28 Collision between container
ship GLORY TIANJIN andtug
boat Fugaku Maru
2019/4/20 Collision between container
ship TRIUMPH and oil tanker
Kaisei Maru
2019/2/27 Collision between container
ships TRIUMPH and HEUNGA JAKARTA
2019/2/21 Collision between container
ship PACIFIC BEIJING and
fishing vessel Nikko Maru No.2
2019/1/31 Collision between container
ship Futaba and cargo ship
Seisho Maru
2018/7/14 Collision between container
ship NYK CONSTELLATION
and fishing vessel Takuyo
Maru
2018/5/31 Collision between container
ship CAPE NABIL and tug
boat Tenjo Maru No.8
2018/2/15 Collision between container
ship EF ELENA and cargo ship
EVER PROSPERITY
2017/11/24 Collision between container
ship CRYSTAL ARROW and
pleasure boat Nada Maru
2016/10/14 Collision between container
ship PEGASUS PACER and
fishing vessel Wajima Maru
No.16
2016/9/22 Collision between container
ship MARVEL and fishing
vessel Kasuga Maru
2016/4/12 Collision between container
ship JI HONG and fishing
vessel Eishin Maru
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Country
Japan

Japan
Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Number

ID

56 2016kb0015

57 2016mj0016

58 2015kb0123

59 2015mj0109

60 2015mj0071

61 2015kb0048

62 2015kb0050

63 2015hs0060

64 2015hs0041

65 2015kb0013

66 2015kb0011

67 2015mj0007

68 2014mj0121

69 2014mj0105

70 2014mj0092

71 2014yh0113

Occurrence
Title
date
2016/1/27 Collision between container
ship MAGNA and fishing
vessel Takaryo Maru
2015/12/27 Collision between container
ship GOLDEN SHOWER ACE
and fishing vessel Mitsu Maru
2015/11/10 Collision between container
ships CAPE FORBY and JRS
CARINA
2015/11/3 Collision between container
ship UNI-POPULAR and
chemical tanker PRETTY
HANA
2015/7/12 Collision between container
ship PEGASUS PACER and
tug and burge Spineer III(3)
2015/6/5 Collision between container
ship VENUS C and container
ship J.PIONEER
2015/6/5 Collisino between container
ship VENUS C and container
ships Maya and Koyo
2015/5/14 Collision between container
ship CHATTANOOGA and
chemical tanker STO IRIS
2015/4/1 Collision between cotainer ship
Tosei and tug and burge unit
Emerald (1)
2015/1/28 Collision between container
ship MAERSK ERVING and
working vessel Goryu
2015/1/14 Collision between container
ship WAN HAI 261 and cargo
ship Tomisu Maru
2014/12/27 Collision between container
ship MARVEL and fishing
vessel Tadahiro Maru
2014/11/18 Collision between container
ship YI SHENG and fishing
carrer No. 2010 Bosung
2014/9/24 Collision between container
ship SUNNY MARPLE and
fishing vessel Kichi Maru
2014/8/22 Collision between container
ship Shosho Maru and fishing
vessel Naho Maru No.1
2014/8/12 Collision between container
ship SINOKOR YOKOHAMA
and cargo ship STARLINK
HOPE
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Country
Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Number

ID

72 2014mj0081

73 2014kb0075

74 2014sd0039

75 2014mj0001

76 2013mj0171

77 2014kb0020

78 2013kb0170

79 2013yh0164

80 2013mj0147

81 2013kb0148

82 2013yh0136

83 2013hs0068

84 2013hs0075

85 2013mj0024

86 2012hs0204

87 2012kb0111

Occurrence
Title
date
2014/7/24 Collision between container
ship BOHAI STAR and fishing
vessel Kaiho Maru No.18
2014/7/3 Collision between container
ship VENUS C and container
ship J.PIONEER
2014/6/26 Collision between container
ship SINOKOR TOKYO and
fishing vessel Fukusyo Maru
2014/1/6 Collision between container
ship HELMUTH RAMBOW
and tug boat Shintou 1 and
burge Shinei 2
2013/12/9 Collision between container
ships SITC YOKOHAMA and
BO HAI
2013/11/29 Collision between cargo ship
ASIAN JOY and container ship
Koyo
2013/11/28 Collision between container
ship OSG BEAUTEC and car
carrier OCEAN PRIDE
2013/11/13 Collision between container
ship IKARIA and fishing vessel
Tsukasa Maru No.26
2013/11/6 Collision between container
ship SITC BUSAN and fishing
vessel Koyoshi Maru
2013/10/2 Collision between container
ship SAFMARINE MAKUTU
and cargo ship PICES
2013/9/5 Collision between coantainer
ship STX TOKYO and cargo
ship Nikko Maru
2013/4/13 Collision between container
ship HAPPY STAR and tug
boat Sumiriki Maru No. 22 and
burge S-23
2013/3/6 Collision berween container
ship Tenma and cargo ship
Swanishi Maru No.3
2013/3/5 Collision between container
ship QIU JIN and fishing vessel
Kahou Maru No.3
2012/9/25 Collision between container
ship HAI MEN and cargo ship
Sanmanyoshi 5
2012/8/23 Collision between container
ship Hiyodori and bulk carrier
Koyo Maru
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Country
Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Number

ID

88 2012yh0090

89 2012yh0089

90 2011mj0188

91 2011yh0212

92 2011kb0190

93 2011yh0156

94 2011nh0037

95 2011hs0154

96 2011ns0018

97 2011yh0041

98 2011sd0021

Occurrence
Title
date
2012/6/20 Collision between container
ships WAN HAI 306 and UNIPROMOTE
2012/6/19 Collision between container
ship SUN ROAD and liquid
bulk carrier Koho Maru No.18
2011/12/18 Collision between container
ship X-PRESS
ANNUAPURNA and fishing
vessel Hakuho Maru No.8
2011/11/26 Collision between container
ship COSCO Y0KOHAMA
and fishing vessel Yujin Maru
No.7
2011/11/16 Collision between container
ship CHASTINE MAERSK
and liquid chemical bulk carrier
Kaiyu 21
2011/8/26 Collision between container
ship QIU JIN and work vessel
Taiho Maru No.5
2011/8/11 Collision between container
ship MELL SEMAKAU and
fishing vessel Kaiho Maru
2011/6/21 Collision between cargo ship
PHOENIX ISLAND II and
container ship PROVIDENCE
2011/3/9 Collision between container
ship UNI-POPULAR and
fishing vessel Ebisu Maru No.8
2011/3/2 Collision between container
ship CLL NINGBO and cargo
ship Kiyotake Maru
2011/2/1 Collision between container
ship KOTA DAHLIA and
container ship Olion
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Country
Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

Japan

